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Abstract. Purported evidence for purposeful divine action in the cosmos may 
appear to warrant describing God as personal, as Swinburne proposes. In this 
paper, however, I  argue that the primary understanding of what is meant by 
a person is formed by the experience of ‘I’ – ‘you’ or second-person relatedness, 
a mode of relation with God that is not part of natural theology. moreover, even 
among human beings, the recognition of purposeful agency does not invariably 
lead to the attribution of personhood in the usual sense. ‘Person’ is therefore 
a misleading term to use of God on the evidence of cosmic purpose alone in the 
absence of suitable revelation.
INTroDuCTIoN
I  begin with an extract from John Wisdom’s influential paper ‘Gods’, 
published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in 1944:
Two people return to their long neglected garden and find among the 
weeds a few of the old plants surprisingly vigorous. one says to the other 
‘It must be that a gardener has been coming and doing something about 
these plants.’ upon enquiry they find that no neighbour has ever seen 
anyone at work in their garden. The first man says to the other ‘He must 
have worked while people slept.’ The other says ‘No, someone would 
have heard him and besides, anybody who cared about the plants would 
have kept down these weeds’  ... each learns all the other learns about 
this [what happens to gardens generally without attention] and about 
the garden. Consequently, when after all this, one says ‘I  still believe 
a  gardener comes’ while the other says ‘I  don’t’ their different words 
now reflect no difference as to what they have found in the garden, no 
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difference as to what they would find in the garden if they looked further 
and no difference about how fast untended gardens fall into disorder.1
Wisdom’s ‘parable of the gardener’ achieved fame in the twentieth 
century principally through its reformulation in an article by Anthony 
Flew, ‘Theology and Falsification’, an article published initially in an 
undergraduate journal while Flew was still unambiguously an atheist. 
Flew gave the parable a more polemical edge than the original version, 
articulating the challenge in the starkest terms, ‘Just how does what 
you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from 
an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?’2 For Flew, 
therefore, theological utterances about purposeful divine action in the 
cosmos are incapable of falsification and endemically evil, a  judgment 
that was described as continuing to haunt the discussion of religious 
language nearly three decades later.3
Perhaps surprisingly, considering that Wisdom offered a  parable 
rather than a proof, responses to the challenge of falsification have often 
tacitly accepted the premise that the cosmos does in fact present an 
ambiguous face to those seeking evidence for divine action.4 In recent 
1 J. Wisdom, ‘Gods’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 45, New Series (January, 
1944), 191-192.
2 Flew’s commentary was first published at oxford in the first issue of an ephemeral 
undergraduate journal called University, which is now difficult to obtain, but the 
reprinted material can be found in Antony Flew and Alasdair C. macIntyre, New Essays 
in Philosophical Theology (london: SCm Press, 1955), pp. 96-108. Flew gave the parable 
a polemical edge, describing explorers attempting to detect the gardener, whom no one 
has ever seen, by surrounding the clearing they have found with an electrified barbed-
wire fence and patrolling it with bloodhounds. Such additional elements were, of course, 
gratuitous: advocates of physicalism are, of course, perfectly content to accept invisible 
and intangible causal agents provided they are sufficiently regular and well-behaved: 
gravitational fields and neutrino beams being contemporary examples. Flew’s views on 
God apparently changed later in life; see Antony Flew, There is a God: How the World’s 
Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind, 1st ed. (New York: Harperone, 2007).
3 larry r. Churchill, ‘Flew, Wisdom, and Polanyi: The Falsification Challenge 
revisited’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 3, no. 3 (1972), 185.
4 Hence in the years following Wisdom’s paper, a great deal of work was done on the 
philosophy of perception and the gestalt that is sometimes associated today with right-
hemispheric cognition of the world. For some subtle early work on the philosophy of 
perception, see michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society (london: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 
oxford university Press, 1946). For an account of religious belief shaping a  person’s 
‘seeing as’ experience of the world, see, for example, John Hick, God and the Universe of 
Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (london: macmillan, 1973), especially chap. 3. 
For neuroscientific evidence that may reinforce the importance of perceiving some kind 
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decades, however, there have been some unexpected challenges to this 
assumption. In particular, contemporary physics has suggested that the 
relative values of many cosmic variables, their so-called ‘fine-tuning’, 
seem absurdly precise, rather as if the observers in Wisdom’s parable 
have found that certain of the plants in the garden are growing in perfect 
rows, aligned to subatomic precision. As a  consequence, although the 
reality and meaning of fine-tuning are still matters of fierce debate, the 
question of the discernment of divine, purposeful action in the cosmos 
has remained a surprisingly vigorous one.5
Without attempting to adjudicate this debate, I  want in this paper 
to examine critically an inference that is often made or implied by the 
purported discernment of such action. most discourses about a  ‘first 
cause’ in natural theology or philosophy, such as an ‘unmoved mover’ 
or ‘necessary ground of being’ or ‘that greater than which nothing can 
be conceived’, do not in themselves convey any sense that this first cause 
could or should be described as personal. Cosmic purpose is different, 
since purpose is often associated with personal agency in daily life. 
of gestalt as well as individual facts, see the account of the effects of right-hemispheric 
brain damage in Iain mcGilchrist, The Master and his Emissary: the Divided Brain and the 
Making of the Western World (New Haven; london: Yale university Press, 2009), chap. 2. 
Note also Churchill’s comment, that a believer, in order to communicate the difference 
made by a  religious perspective on the world, will ‘always and of necessity employ 
myths, parables, metaphors and sketches’, that is, modes of discourse that communicate 
contextual frameworks and evoke embodied experiences: Churchill, ‘Flew, Wisdom, and 
Polanyi: The Falsification Challenge revisited’, p. 185. Yet as contemporary talk of ‘selfish’ 
or ‘selfless’ genes and other examples testify, the association of the objects of science with 
grand narratives and metaphors that are not in themselves falsifiable is scarcely unique 
to a religious perspective and may be an important, even indispensable aspect of what 
it means to cognize the world in any kind of ordered manner. As examples of divergent 
grand narratives applied to similar scientific facts, see richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene: 
30th Anniversary Edition, 3rd revised ed. (oxford: ouP, 2006) and Charles Foster, The 
Selfless Gene: Living with God and Darwin (london: Hodder & Stoughton, 2009).
5 For contrasting views and an overview of some of the strengths and weakness of the 
multiverse proposal, see robert J. Spitzer, New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions 
of Contemporary Physics and Philosophy (Grand rapids, mich.; Cambridge, uK: William 
b eerdmans Publishing Co, 2010) and Victor J. Stenger, Fallacy of Fine-Tuning (New 
York: Prometheus, 2011). For a good overview of the range of philosophical positions 
regarding fine-tuning, see ernan mcmullin, ‘Anthropic explanation in Cosmology’, Faith 
and Philosophy, 22, no. 5 (2005): 601-614. It should be noted that theoretical physicists 
do tend to see fine-tuning as a  ‘problem’ at present; see, for example, lee Smolin, The 
Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes 
Next (New York: Houghton mifflin Harcourt, 2006), especially chap. 11.
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In Wisdom’s parable, for example, the invisible agent who may or may 
not be causing change in the garden is not a  mere inanimate force, 
a  living being or even some complex machine that weeds and waters 
automatically. A gardener, invisible or not, is a personal agent, applying 
abstract thought, combined with artistry to achieve some goal. When 
a garden shows evidence for such action, we therefore have no hesitation 
in classifying the agent responsible as ‘someone’ rather than ‘something’, 
to adopt Spaemann’s phrase.6 Can the same inference be made for God? 
In other words, if the evidence shows that the cosmos has been put 
into an unexpectedly ordered state as a  result of purposeful action by 
a rational agent, would it be reasonable to infer that this agent is also best 
described as ‘someone’ rather than ‘something’?
of course, one could simply define persons in terms of their capacity 
for rational, intentional action, as, for example, Swinburne does,
In personal explanation the occurrence of an event E is explained as 
brought about by a rational agent or person P, having the intention J to 
bring about E ... Clearly the theist, in claiming that there is an omnipotent 
spirit, God, who makes or brings about (or permits the bringing-about 
of) all logically contingent things apart from himself, is using personal 
explanation.7
In Swinburne’s approach, it seems that a  rational agent intending 
to bring about some state of affairs is a  ‘person’, and God is therefore 
personal on the basis of divine action of this kind, but I fear that such 
a definition begs the question. In addressing this issue, however, I make 
the following caveats.
First, ‘purposeful’ action is an ambiguous concept, part of a  broad 
spectrum of apparently teleological actions in nature. When ancient 
artefacts such as the Antikythera mechanism are discovered, we have 
no hesitation in concluding that these objects were deliberately designed 
and constructed for some purpose, yet the term ‘purpose’ is also 
frequently attributed to agents that are not normally regarded as persons. 
6 robert Spaemann, Persons: The Difference Between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’ 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2006).
7 richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, rev. ed. (oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), pp. 137, 141-142. See also The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2004), pp. 21, 35–45 in which Swinburne defines personal explanation as an explanation 
of a phenomenon as brought about intentionally by a rational agent, a ‘person’ who has 
‘at least the complexity of sensations, desires, beliefs, etc. typical of human beings’.
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many non-human animals are naturally described as showing evidence 
of voluntary, ‘purposeful’ action and some even use tools to achieve 
complex goals.8 At a  broader level of generalisation, even plants have 
been found to ‘select’ growth strategies to attain goals conducive to their 
flourishing, as in the case of the dodder plant that can distinguish wheat 
and tomato plants at a distance.9 At the broadest level of all, immanent 
end-directed action is increasingly recognised as an irreducible property 
of complex dynamical systems that are not even living.10
The only category of ‘purpose’ relevant for considerations of 
possible divine cosmic action, however, must be that which involves the 
understanding and selection of abstract principles and goals, such as those 
pertaining to the formal relations of purported fine-tuning. These kinds 
of purposeful actions are reasonably easy to identify when examining the 
actions of biological beings. birds, for example, display great intelligence 
in navigation and building nests but they do not bury their dead, build 
astronomical mechanisms or construct their nests in the gothic style. 
To give another example, a  rabbit may decide to eat a  carrot, but not 
every third carrot.11 Such activities require understanding and intending 
abstract goals, capabilities that are, among animals, uniquely attributed 
to human and hence personal agency. The question is whether the same 
attribution of personal agency could also be made of God on the basis of 
purposeful action involving abstract principles and goals in the cosmos.
Second, the objection could be made that the notion of a  person 
and a  personal God first arose in the context of theology, specifically 
08 The Antikythera mechanism is a highly complex artefact of some thirty interlocking 
bronze gears discovered northwest of Crete at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Although there is still some doubt as to its intended use, there is no doubt that this 
artefact was brought about by a rational agent or agents who had the intention to create 
it for some purpose. See, for example, Derek De Solla Price, ‘Gears from the Greeks: 
The Antikythera mechanism – A  Calendar Computer from ca. 80 b.C.’, American 
Philosophical Society, 64, no. 7 (1974), 1-70. For an argument that the term ‘purpose’ is 
also warranted in interpreting the actions of non-human animals, see, for example, mary 
midgley, ‘Why the Idea of Purpose Won’t Go Away’, Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy, 86, no. 338 (october 1, 2011), 545-561.
09 Daniel Chamovitz, What a Plant Knows (oxford: oneworld Publications, 2012).
10 See, for example, Gianfranco basti, Filosofia Della Natura e Della Scienza, vol.  I 
(rome: lateran university Press, 2002).
11 The example of the bird building a nest in the gothic style is taken from Gilbert 
Keith Chesterton, The Everlasting Man (london: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925), chap. 1. 
I am grateful to John Haldane for the example of a rabbit eating every third carrot.
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Christian revealed theology.12 Given that pre-Christian philosophy did 
not conclude that God is personal, it would seem plausible that natural 
theology would also fail to reach this conclusion more generally, if the 
doctrinal and cultural influences of revealed theology were stripped 
away. The response could be made, however, that the question is still 
an open one for two reasons. First, at least some of what is said of God 
in pre-Christian philosophy could be construed as personal language, 
such as, for example, the notion of following in God’s company or 
friendship in Plato’s later writings.13 Second, although historically the 
idea of a  personal God developed from the working out of Christian 
revelation, this fact does not in itself rule out the possibility that such an 
insight might have been derived by natural reason alone in some other 
way, sooner or later.
Third, there are many on-going controversies surrounding the 
question of whether or not the notion of a  personal God is coherent, 
drawing from the dissimilarities between God’s existence and our own, 
such as atemporal versus temporal existence.14 In this paper, however, 
I  restrict myself to a  more basic issue. If divine action in the cosmos 
can be identified and if such action is purposeful, involving the selection 
of abstract principles and goals, is it reasonable to conclude on this 
basis that God is personal? If so, then a debate can still take place over 
the coherence of the term ‘person’ in the light of the other purported 
attributes of God, such as simplicity. If not, then it is unlikely that the 
question is going to arise anyway, since it is cosmic purpose that seems 
the most promising basis on which to conclude that God is personal 
on the basis of natural theology alone. either way, examining the link 
between the discernment of purpose and the ascription of personhood 
is an important one.
THe ASCrIPTIoN oF PerSoNHooD
on what basis do we call some being a  ‘person’? A  definition is not 
straightforward since persons are not a  subdivision of some broader 
12 ‘We began to speak of God as a  person only when we began to speak of three 
persons in one God.’ Spaemann, Persons, p. 40.
13 See, for example, Plato, Laws, IV, 716a-b.
14 For some recent criticisms of the coherence of the notion of a  personal God, 
especially as presented in the arguments of Swinburne, see Herman Philipse, God in the 
Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason (oxford: oxford university Press, 2012), 
pp. 109-119.
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genus in the way in which man is a  ‘rational animal’ in the biological 
world. boethius’ famous definition of a person as an individual substance 
of a rational nature has long been recognized as unsatisfactory and one 
cannot rely on equating being a person with being human if the issue to be 
examined is the personhood of God.15 much contemporary philosophical 
discussion about persons is framed in terms of ethics, an example being 
Timothy Chappell’s description of persons as belonging to the ‘primary 
moral constituency’.16 With this focus, the main tasks of philosophical 
argumentation have been to determine the extent of application of the 
term ‘person’, starting from the basis that all or at least some human 
beings are ‘persons’, and to examine what this attribution means for 
ethical decisions. In these discussions, personhood is the ‘whatever 
it is’, if anything, that is added to being a human being to warrant the 
dignity of belonging to the ‘primary moral constituency’. Contemporary 
discussions of whether certain higher animals can be considered 
‘persons’ are essentially of the same kind, that is, ethical questions in 
disguise, and insofar as they give a  definition of ‘person’ they tend to 
fall back on locke’s identification of personal identity with a  distinct, 
persisting incommunicable consciousness.17 Such discussions do not, 
however, bring us any nearer to a resolution of the issue of whether God 
can be considered personal, since God is not a member of our species, or 
any species. Furthermore, even if locke’s approach to personal identity 
is not problematic in itself, it does not seem especially helpful for the 
problem at hand. Attempting to adjudicate on the personhood of God 
using the criterion of distinct, persisting incommunicable consciousness 
seems both inherently challenging and difficult to relate to purported 
evidence of cosmic divine action. Are there any other ways to address 
this question?
on this issue, I  refer to Spaemann, who excels in highlighting the 
many peculiarities of the term ‘person’. Persons, he notes, are not simply 
members of a class and ‘do not share personhood as a common attribute, 
15 boethius, De persona et duabus naturis, c. 2. For some early criticisms of boethius’ 
definition of a person by richard of St Victor, see Spaemann, Persons, pp. 29-30.
16 Timothy Chappell, ‘on The Very Idea of Criteria For Personhood’, The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, 49, no. 1 (2011), 1-27.
17 An example is the discussion of whether some animals could be considered as 
‘persons’ in Peter Singer, How Are We To Live? Ethics in An Age of Self-Interest (oxford: 
oxford university Press, 1997), pp. 110-111. See also John locke, Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, II.27, ‘of Identity and Diversity’ (1690).
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in the way that human beings share humanity’.18 For example, there is no 
doubt that ‘I’ refers to something real, but,
When we say ‘I’, we are not referring to ‘an ego’ – a pure invention of the 
philosophers! – but to a particular living creature, a particular human 
being identified by other speakers with the use of a personal name. but 
when this particular human being identifies the selfsame person that he 
or she actually is, the term ‘I’ is used.19
Spaemann goes on to point out various peculiarities with this self-
identification, notably that there is no unclarity about what ‘I’ refers to, 
regardless of any qualitative features whatsoever, even to the extent of 
someone forgetting who he is, robbed of memory and even forgetting that 
he is a human being. This latter point sets up an argument that being ‘I’ and 
being a human being are not simply interchangeable, a point reinforced 
by the fact that person (hupostatis) was specifically distinguished from 
having a nature (phusis) in the development of the early Christology and 
Trinitarian theology from which the concept of a ‘person’ first emerged.20 
He also highlights the inherent uniqueness, subjectivity, singularity, 
irreducibility and incommunicability of the one who says ‘I’, from the 
perspective of the one who says this. This ‘I’ is a relational uniqueness, 
since, according to Spaemann, this is defined by a ‘place’ in the universe 
relative to everything else that can never be that person.21
These observations serve to underline how my own personhood, at 
least, is not something that is reducible to an objective state of affairs, even 
being a member of the human species, but what about the personhood 
of others, which is the key issue in addressing the question of the 
personhood of God? To what, or rather to whom – the distinctiveness of 
the grammar manifests the distinctiveness of the task – can ‘I’ or anyone 
else who self-identifies as ‘I’ ascribe personhood? Some clues from 
the language we use to denote persons may help to shed light on this 
problem. In many languages, the third-person forms are ambiguous, that 
is to say, the same grammatical structures can be used to describe the 
states of affairs of both personal and impersonal beings, and the reports 
of the actions of a  distant agent may or may not lead us to infer that 
this agent is a person. The second-person forms are different. To use the 
18 Spaemann, Persons, pp. 16, 62.
19 Ibid., p. 9.
20 Ibid., pp. 10, 28.
21 Ibid., p. 37.
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‘you’ form is to acknowledge that one is addressing a person, who is also 
irreducible and unique, and ‘I’ and ‘you’ are paired in language, a point 
to which martin buber famously drew attention.22
So what are the circumstances that shape the use of the second-person 
forms in grammar? This question is not easy because in the standard 
ways of expressing how we know others, that is, theorizing that a thing 
has a mind or a particular kind of internal causal structure, it is unclear 
how exactly ‘it’ becomes ‘you’, a point Jane Heal has mentioned. For this 
reason among others, some researchers have suggested that the origins 
of the distinctive second-person grammatical forms are to be found 
in varieties of interpersonal relatedness that precede the acquisition of 
language and which go under the name of joint attention.23 examples 
of such interactions include pointing out objects to others, reciprocal 
smiling, lifting hands to be picked up and so on, activities that have 
been described as a  ‘sharing an awareness of the sharing of the focus’ 
with another person, arguably the primordial mode of interpersonal 
communication in a human life.24 A close association of joint attention 
and second-person relatedness is also suggested by the fact that an 
inhibition of the former is often correlated with difficulties in learning 
and using the second-person forms of grammar correctly.25
experiences of joint attention are not just important for shaping the 
use of the second-person form in grammar, however, but are, I suggest, 
the primary experiences for shaping our understanding of persons 
generally. As Iain mcGilchrist has argued, every word, sooner or later, 
has ‘to lead us out of the web of language, to the lived world, ultimately 
to ... something that relates to our embodied experience’.26 In the case of 
the word ‘person’, when we hear or read this word, our understanding is 
shaped by our embodied experiences of persons. A plausible candidate 
for the most significant of these embodied experiences is second-person 
22 martin buber, Ich und Du, 1 aufl. (leipzig: Insel-Verlang, 1923).
23 See, for example, Jane Heal, ‘Joint Attention and understanding the mind’, in Joint 
Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, ed. by 
Naomi eilan et al. (New York: oxford university Press, 2005), pp. 34-44 (p. 41).
24 Naomi eilan, ‘Joint Attention, Communication, and mind’, in eilan et al., Joint 
Attention, pp. 1–33. The phrase ‘sharing an awareness of the sharing of the focus’ is from 
Peter Hobson, ‘What Puts Jointness into Joint Attention?’, also in Joint Attention, pp. 
185–204 (p. 185).
25 Andrew Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics: Virtues and 
Gifts (New York; Abingdon, uK: routledge, 2012), pp. 47-49.
26 mcGilchrist, The Master and his Emissary, p. 116.
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relatedness or joint attention, since these experiences are uniquely with 
other persons, play a  crucial role in human development from a  very 
young age and continue throughout life for as long as a person is in any 
kind of social setting. All kinds of other experiences may, of course, be 
associated with the term ‘person’, but it is, I suggest, this experience of 
relating as an ‘I’ to a ‘you’ that is primary for most of us in grounding 
the meaning of the word and which also, it has been argued, underpins 
much of the ethical significance of the term ‘person’.27
At first glance, therefore, it seems that any possibility that God can be 
regarded as personal on this basis can and should be dismissed within 
natural theology. God’s divine nature is spiritual and is not present to our 
senses the way that human persons are. In addition, the kinds of activities 
that might be interpreted as enabling second-person relatedness to God 
by other means, such as inspired narratives, covenants, liturgies, and 
modes of relation associated with the Incarnation, seem to be exclusively 
the prerogative of revealed or supernatural theology.28 moreover, even 
the use of second-person forms to address God is uncommon in classical 
philosophical texts that refer to divine matters, in marked contrast to 
the frequent use of ‘you’ to denote God in later Christian writings, such 
as those of Augustine. These structural and grammatical differences 
arguably underline that second-person relatedness to God pertains 
exclusively to revealed theology.29
Nevertheless, the situation is not entirely hopeless. There are many 
human beings, for example, whom we have never met and may never 
meet, who we still regard as persons insofar as we are members of the 
same species, the typical perfection of which includes the ability to 
relate in a  second-personal way as circumstances allow. moreover, 
our experience of persons also teaches that those beings to whom we 
relate second-personally are also the ones uniquely capable of abstract 
reasoning and goals. Given that all the beings that we know to be capable 
27 A recent argument for the importance of second-person relatedness in grounding 
ethics is Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and 
Accountability (Cambridge, mass.; london: Harvard university Press, 2006).
28 For a recent study of key Scriptural narratives interpreted in the light of second-
person relatedness to God and others, see eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: 
Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010).
29 Classical texts tend to refer more or less exclusively to God in the third-person, for 
example, Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 7, 1072b14-30. by way of contrast, see, for example, 
the famous prayer, ‘late have I  loved you’, in Augustine, Confessions of St. Augustine, 
Books I-X, trans. Francis J. Sheed (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942), X.27.
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of such reasoning are also personal beings, is there any warrant for 
describing God as personal on the same basis, namely the discernment 
of purposeful divine action involving abstract reasoning in the cosmos?
Adjudication is not easy, because agents capable of abstract reasoning 
and goals are almost invariably identified as persons in the normal way, 
to the extent that it may be hard to imagine an alternative classification. 
Nevertheless, some intriguing exceptions have emerged from recent work 
in experimental psychology. Peter Hobson describes an experiment that 
tested sixteen children and adolescents with autism and sixteen others 
without autism who were similar in age and linguistic ability. These 
children were shown an experimenter performing a variety of actions 
with some simple objects and, at a later time, they were given the same 
objects and asked to use them. Although most of the children repeated 
most of the actions they had seen the experimenter perform, a marked 
difference emerged as to how they used the objects. In Hobson’s words,
The children without autism were imitating the person of the experi-
menter, and in so doing they assumed his style as well as his approach to 
accomplishing each goal. The children with autism watched and imitated 
the action rather than the person doing the action.30
Those with autism therefore cognized the purposeful actions of these 
agents to the point of being able to imitate their actions readily, but they 
did not cognize the agents as persons in the normal way.
Some caveats and clarifications are needed. Those with autism do not 
have any particular difficulty in recognising that persons are unique kinds 
of beings in the world, and perform just as well as those without autism 
in distinguishing persons from non-persons.31 Those with autism do not, 
however, generally engage in joint attention activities such as pointing 
and, as they learn language, they have a peculiar difficulty in using the ‘I’ 
and ‘you’ forms in grammar correctly, a phenomenon known as pronoun 
reversal.32 As a result, the primary metaphoric understanding of the term 
30 Hobson, ‘What Puts Jointness into Joint Attention?’, p. 200. 
31 Ibid., p. 191.
32 leo Kanner, ‘Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact’, Nerv. Child, 2:220 (1943); 
reprinted in leo Kanner, ‘Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact’, Acta Paedopsychiatrica, 
35, no. 4 (1968), 100-136. For a comparison of pronoun reversal in autistic and Down’s 
syndrome children, see, for example, Helen Tager-Flusberg, ‘Dissociations in Form and 
Function in the Acquisition of language by Autistic Children: Studies of Atypical Children’, 
in Constraints on Language Acquisition: Studies of Atypical Children, ed. by Helen Tager-
Flusberg (Hillsdale, N.J.; Hove: erlbaum, 1994), pp. 174-194 (p. 184).
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‘person’ that is, for most of us, drawn from the experience of second-
person relatedness, is absent from their worldview, an absence manifested 
in the way they are sometimes described as not ‘seeing’ persons at all.33
What is striking about these results is that the situations being 
described involve only human persons carrying out human actions 
in human ways, and yet the recognition of purposeful agents does not 
invariably lead to an ascription of personhood in the way that the term 
‘person’ is understood typically. In the case of cosmic divine action, the 
situation is disproportionately more challenging. even if we discern the 
intelligent order we expect of purposeful action, perhaps with the bonus 
of perceiving a certain artistry in the cosmos – as might be claimed of 
the elegance of the laws of physics or of beautiful fractal structures such 
as the mandelbrot Set – this is not the same as discerning the purpose.34 
Indeed, many theists and atheists concur that what the divine purpose 
is or even whether this purpose is good in terms of ultimate human (or 
other) flourishing are notoriously difficult to determine on the basis of our 
natural knowledge of the world alone.35 moreover, if there is a God who 
has acted in a purposeful manner in creation, the ways in which any such 
purposes are achieved seem, to the best of our knowledge, very different 
to the ways in which human persons go about achieving their goals.
So there seems to be little warrant for describing God as personal 
on the basis of the discernment of purposeful action in the cosmos 
alone. The use of the term ‘person’ may even be misleading, since the 
metaphoric understanding of the word is shaped by experiences of 
second-person relatedness that are inapplicable to a relationship to God 
in the absence of divine help. If there is any hope of connecting the 
33 Clara Claiborne Park, The Siege: The First Eight Years of an Autistic Child (With an 
Epilogue, Fifteen Years After) (boston, london: little, brown and Company, 1982), p. 93.
34 Heinz-otto Peitgen and Peter H. richter, The Beauty of Fractals: Images of Complex 
Dynamical Systems (berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986).
35 As an example from a  theistic perspective, Newman claims that we cannot gain 
knowledge of God’s purposes simply from the study of the cosmos, as shown by his 
claims in the following passage, ‘religion, it has been well observed, is something relative 
to us; a  system of commands and promises of God towards us. but how are we to be 
concerned with the sun, moon, and stars? or with the laws of the universe? ... They do 
not speak to sinners at all. They were created before Adam fell. They “declare the glory 
of God”, but not his will.’ See John Henry Newman, ‘Sermon XXIV: The religion of the 
Day’, in Parochial and Plain Sermons: Volume I, New ed. (london; New York: longmans, 
Green, 1891). As an example from an atheistic perspective, see Philipse, God in the Age 
of Science?, pp. 256-278.
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discernment of cosmic purpose with the discernment of the personhood 
of God, the most promising approach may in fact work in the opposite 
direction. Cultures shaped by the revelation of a  personal God with 
whom second-person relatedness is possible may tend to perceive the 
cosmos in certain beneficial ways, for example with the expectation that 
it is ordered and that at least some aspects of this order can be known by 
us. Such a perspective seems prima facie to be a more promising starting 
point than a deep-rooted belief in cosmic disorder, accidental order, or 
a remote and unknowable deity.36 An argument may then be possible that 
resembles Pascal’s wager, insofar as a commitment to faith in a personal 
God may be seen to be a fruitful cultural wager for understanding and 
representing the natural world, for example in art.37 Nevertheless, such 
a method is at best likely to yield only certain fruitful signs rather than 
anything approaching a rigorous proof.
36 For an early example of this perception of cosmic order in the light of revelation, 
see, for example, this text from what is perhaps the earliest authentic Christian 
document outside of the New Testament, the First Letter of Clement, 20, ‘The heavens, 
revolving under his government, are subject to him in peace. Day and night run the 
course appointed by him, in no wise hindering each other. The sun and moon, with 
the companies of the stars, roll on in harmony according to his command, within their 
prescribed limits, and without any deviation. The fruitful earth, according to his will, 
brings forth food in abundance, at the proper seasons, for man and beast and all the 
living beings upon it, never hesitating, nor changing any of the ordinances which he has 
fixed.’ Note that at end of the first century, when the Christian community was small and 
threatened, this letter communicates a surprising sense of the order and harmony of the 
cosmos on the grandest scales in the light of the new Christian revelation. The translation 
is from James Donaldson and Alexander roberts, eds., The Apostolic Fathers with Justin 
Martyr and Irenaeus, vol. I, Ante-Nicene Christian library: Translations of the Writings 
of the Fathers down to A.D. 325 (edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1867).
37 Correlation is not, of course, causation and a variety of narratives could be told 
to explain the same facts about the fruitfulness or otherwise of a  culture, but art is 
instructive because it provides an insight into the context or gestalt, often shaped by 
faith, within which the world is cognized by a society. Second-person relatedness to God 
as a theme of art, with nature perfected, is a central theme of Van eyck, Ghent Altarpiece 
or The Adoration of the Mystic Lamb, completed in 1432. The emphasis on the themes 
of revelation gradually faded in the sixteenth century, a  transition seen in Joachim 
Patinir, The Penitence of St Jerome, completed c. 1518, and Pieter bruegel the elder, 
The Harvesters, in 1565. In later centuries, themes of nature alone often dominate, as in 
Constable, The Hay Wain, 1821, but disintegration of form and loss of hope sets in at least 
by the time of Van Gogh, Wheatfield with Crows, painted in 1890 and Pollock, Enchanted 
Forest, painted in 1947, which has no discernible features left. on balance, the earlier 
faith-based perspectives on the world, rooted in second-person relatedness to God, seem 
to have inspired greater order and beauty than their less faith-based successors.
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Although we are justified in attributing the production of sophisticated 
artefacts, showing evidence of abstract reasoning and goals, to personal 
agency, this attribution is only ever indirect, namely that such artefacts 
are thereby revealed as being the work of human beings and hence of 
persons such as ourselves. In the case of God, no such attribution can 
be made, since God is not, by divine nature, a member of our species or 
any species. moreover, even if we succeed in uncovering evidence for 
purposeful divine action in the cosmos, involving abstract reasoning 
and goals, the term ‘person’ is only justified thereby in a Swinburnian 
sense. Since the meaning of the term ‘person’ is shaped, for most of us, 
primarily by the experience of second-person relatedness, the attribution 
of personhood, whether to other human beings or to God, cannot follow 
simply from evidence of purposeful agency if there is no pre-existing 
capacity for second-person relatedness with the agent concerned. In the 
case of God, such a capacity can only come about as a divine gift. Hence, 
evidence of cosmic purpose does not in itself warrant us concluding that 
God is personal in the absence of such a gift.38
bIblIoGrAPHY
Augustine, Confessions of St. Augustine, Books I-X. Translated by Francis J. Sheed 
(New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942)
basti, Gianfranco, Filosofia Della Natura e Della Scienza. Vol. I (rome: lateran 
university Press, 2002)
buber, martin, Ich und Du. 1 aufl. (leipzig: Insel-Verlang, 1923)
Chamovitz, Daniel, What a Plant Knows (oxford: oneworld Publications, 2012)
Chappell, Timothy, ‘on The Very Idea of Criteria For Personhood’, The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, 49, no. 1 (2011), 1-27
Chesterton, Gilbert Keith, The Everlasting Man (london: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925)
Churchill, larry r., ‘Flew, Wisdom, and Polanyi: The Falsification Challenge 
revisited’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 3, no. 3 (1972), 185-194
Darwall, Stephen, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and 
Accountability (Cambridge, mass.; london: Harvard university Press, 2006)
Dawkins, richard, The Selfish Gene: 30th Anniversary Edition, 3rd revised 
edition (oxford: oxford university Press, 2006)
38 This paper was originally presented in munich, at a conference for the Analytic 
Theology Project, generously funded by the John Templeton Foundation.
123CoSmIC PurPoSe AND THe QueSTIoN oF A PerSoNAl GoD
Donaldson, James, and Alexander roberts, eds. The Apostolic Fathers with Justin 
Martyr and Irenaeus, Vol. I. Ante-Nicene Christian library: Translations of 
the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325 (edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1867)
eilan, Naomi, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa mcCormack, and Johannes roessler, 
eds. Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy 
and Psychology (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005)
eilan, Naomi, ‘Joint Attention, Communication, and mind’, in eilan et al., eds. 
Joint Attention, pp. 1–33
Flew, Antony, There is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed 
His Mind, 1st ed. (New York: Harperone, 2007)
Flew, Antony, and Alasdair C. macIntyre, New Essays in Philosophical Theology, 
(london: SCm Press, 1955)
Foster, Charles, The Selfless Gene: Living with God and Darwin, (london: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 2009)
Heal, Jane, ‘Joint Attention and understanding the mind’, in eilan et al., eds. 
Joint Attention, pp. 34-44
Hick, John, God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, 
(london: macmillan, 1973)
Hobson, Peter, ‘What Puts Jointness into Joint Attention?’, in eilan et al., eds. 
Joint Attention, pp. 185-204
Kanner, leo, ‘Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact’, Acta Paedopsychiatrica, 
35, no. 4 (1968), 100-136
mcGilchrist, Iain, The Master and his Emissary: the Divided Brain and the Making 
of the Western World (New Haven; london: Yale university Press, 2009)
mcmullin, ernan, ‘Anthropic explanation in Cosmology’, Faith and Philosophy, 
22, no. 5 (2005), 601-614
midgley, mary, ‘Why the Idea of Purpose Won’t Go Away’, Philosophy: The Journal 
of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 86, no. 338 (october, 2011), 545-561
Newman, John Henry, ‘Sermon XXIV: The religion of the Day’, in Parochial and 
Plain Sermons: Volume I, New ed. (london; NY: longmans, Green, 1891)
Park, Clara Claiborne, The Siege: The First Eight Years of an Autistic Child 
(With an Epilogue, Fifteen Years After) (boston, london: little, brown and 
Company, 1982)
Peitgen, Heinz-otto, and Peter H. richter, The Beauty of Fractals: Images of 
Complex Dynamical Systems (berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986)
Philipse, Herman, God in the Age of Science? A  Critique of Religious Reason 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2012)
Pinsent, Andrew, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics: Virtues and 
Gifts (New York; Abingdon, uK: routledge, 2012)
Polanyi, michael, Science, Faith and Society (london: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 
oxford university Press, 1946)
124 ANDreW PINSeNT
Price, Derek De Solla, ‘Gears from the Greeks: The Antikythera mechanism –  A 
Calendar Computer from CA. 80 b.C.’, American Philosophical Society, 64, 
no. 7 (1974), 1-70
Singer, Peter, How Are We To Live? Ethics in An Age of Self-Interest (oxford: 
oxford university Press, 1997)
Smolin, lee, The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, 
and What Comes Next (New York: Houghton mifflin Harcourt, 2006)
Spaemann, robert, Persons: The Difference Between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’ 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2006)
Spitzer, robert J., New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of 
Contemporary Physics and Philosophy (Grand rapids, mich.; Cambridge, 
uK: William b. eerdmans Publishing Co., 2010)
Stenger, Victor J., Fallacy of Fine-Tuning (New York: Prometheus, 2011)
Stump, eleonore, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
(oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010)
Swinburne, richard, The Coherence of Theism, rev. ed. (oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993)
Swinburne, richard, The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004)
Tager-Flusberg, Helen, ed., Constraints on Language Acquisition: Studies of 
Atypical Children (Hillsdale, N.J.; Hove: erlbaum, 1994)
Wisdom, J., ‘Gods’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 45, New Series 
(January, 1944), 185-206
